A longstanding question concerns whether the constructive nature

A longstanding question concerns whether the constructive nature of memory serves any adaptive function ( Bartlett, 1932; Hardt et al., 2010; Howe, 2011; Newman MLN8237 and Lindsay, 2009; Schacter, 2001; Schacter et al., 2011). The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis states that a critical function of a constructive

memory system is to make information available in a flexible manner for simulation of future events. Specifically, the hypothesis holds that past and future events draw on similar information and rely on similar underlying processes, and that the episodic memory system supports the construction of future events by extracting and recombining stored information into a simulation of a novel event. While this adaptive function allows past information to be used flexibly when simulating alternative future scenarios, the flexibility learn more of memory may also result in vulnerability

to imagination-induced memory errors, where imaginary events are confused with actual events (for further discussion, see Schacter et al., 2011; Schacter, 2012). Note that the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis does not place much theoretical emphasis on temporal processes such as mental time travel ( Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007; Tulving, 2002a, 2002b) but instead emphasizes processes involved in linking together distinct elements of an episode, in particular relational processing capacities that have been linked with hippocampal function ( Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001) and that may contribute to the construction of simulated events. Hassabis and Maguire (2007, 2009; see also Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b; Summerfield et al., 2010) argued that a process of “scene construction” is critically involved in both memory and imagination. Scene construction entails retrieving and integrating perceptual, semantic, and contextual information into a coherent spatial context. Scene construction

is held to be more complex than “simple” visual imagery for individual objects (Kosslyn et al., 2001) because it relies on binding together disparate types of information into a coherent whole, and likely involves processes mediated by several regions within the not default network, most notably the medial temporal lobe (Hassabis et al., 2007a). Scene construction is thought to be a critical component of both memory and imagination as mental simulations, whether of the past, future or purely fictional, because they are all usually framed within a spatial context (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). Buckner and Carroll (2007) contended that the default network underpins “self-projection” processes by which past experiences are used to imagine perspectives and events beyond those in the immediate environment.

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